Bank-issued credit is an important source of external financing for dynamic firms in transition economies. However, banks with a primary mission of issuing loans to private firms have only recently emerged in Russia. While this emergence (and subsequent expansion) appears to be carrying significant implications for Russia's continuing economic development, it is a far from universal phenomenon when viewed from a regional perspective. The purpose of this paper is to document regional patterns of the emergence and expanding importance of bank-issued credit within Russia; to note its relationship with regional patterns of economic activity; and to seek an empirical account of the regional variations we observe. In pursuing the latter objective, we document that regional variations in the influence of the communist party evident in the former Soviet Union retain remarkable explanatory power in accounting for regional variations in bank-financing activity. An account of the persistence of this influence will be the subject of future research.
Introduction
The emergence of bank-issued credit as an important source of financing for private-firm investment is a recent phenomenon within Russia. Prior to 2000, banks certainly existed, but acted primarily as depositories and speculative investors. In consequence, private firms were largely forced to self-finance investment projects from the use of retained earnings or informal sources (e.g., see Shleifer and Treisman, 2001, Chapters 3 and 4; and Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002) . However, the surge in export-driven growth spurred by the massive devaluation of the ruble following the financial crisis of 1998, and enhanced by a corresponding surge in oil prices, helped trigger institutional developments that by 2000 led to the emergence of banks as important sources of private financing (e.g., see Barnard, 2009; Chernykh and Cole, 2008) . This phenomenon gained momentum throughout the course of the decade, so that by 2007 outstanding bank-issued loans to firms, measured as a percentage of GDP, grew from 10.5% in 1999 to 37.3%, implying an annualized growth rate of 17.2% (see Table 1 for details).
In previous work we expand upon below, we have found that the emergence and subsequent expansion of bank-issued credit since 2000 appears to be carrying significant implications for Russia's continuing economic development (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2010) . In particular, based on regional variations observed for both real income and bank-issued credit, two-stage least-squares estimates indicate that one-standard-deviation increases in credit correspond with increases in annual economic growth ranging from 1.2% to 2.1%, depending on the specific measure of credit and regression specification employed. This intra-national evidence complements cross-country studies that have highlighted the role of financial development in general, and bank-issued credits in particular, in stimulating economic growth (e.g., see La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 2005; and Barth et al., 2009). However, this interpretation is subject to a potential caveat we note below.
While the emergence and growth of bank-issued credit is evident within Russia when viewed from an aggregate perspective, it is a far from universal phenomenon when viewed from a regional perspective. The primary purpose of this paper is to document regional patterns of the emergence and expanding importance of bank-issued credit within Russia; to note its relationship with regional patterns of economic activity; and to seek an empirical account of the regional variations we observe.
In pursuing the latter objective, we document two important empirical regularities. First, for regions wherein bank-lending activity is relatively modest, the source of the culprit appears to be from the credit-supply side of the market, rather than the credit-demand side. Based on firm-level survey data compiled by Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2009) , while the self-reported importance of access to credit is similar across regions, self-reported attempts to obtain bank-issued credit are relatively high in credit-poor regions; self-reported successes in obtaining credit are relatively low; and self-reported difficulties in obtaining credit are relatively high (and in all cases, differences are statistically significant).
This evidence is important for interpreting the positive relationship noted above between regional variations in growth and bank-lending activity: apathy towards the pursuit of credit on the part of private firms (resulting e.g., from hostile economic conditions unrelated to credit access) does not appear as an underlying source of the relationship. Instead, credit availability appears as the underlying source.
Second, we find that regional variations in the influence of the communist party evident in the former Soviet Union retain remarkable explanatory power in accounting for regional variations in bankfinancing activity, conditional upon controlling for a battery of additional regional characteristics. Similar patterns of influence across post-Soviet Russia have been documented by McFaul et al. (2004) for voting patterns; Remington (2008 and 2010, chapter Having documented the persistent regional influence of the communist party over the course of post-Soviet Russia's economic transition, we offer preliminary thoughts on factors that account for this persistence. Commercial banks in the former Soviet Union provided financing to state enterprises so that these enterprises could fulfill their plan targets. Because physical planning targets were more important than financial plans, state firms typically had "soft" financial budget constraints and were unconstrained by finance (e.g., see Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003) . Soviet commercial banks also collected taxes from the state enterprise sector, which was the most important tax base. Bank credits also provided a means for regulators to monitor the activities of state enterprises (Garvy, 1977) . In the early stages of Russia's post-Soviet economic transition, commercial banks continued to perform many tasks inherited from the Soviet era, including providing credit to state firms, financing state-related programs, financing government debt, and even helping to redistribute state assets (Tompson, 1997) .
The bottom line on these thoughts is the feeling that "old habits are hard to break". Under this "old habits" view, resistance towards the emergence of banks as important sources of credit for financing entrepreneurial activity should tend to be particularly strong in regions wherein sympathy towards the Soviet model of banking is strongest: i.e., in regions wherein the influence of the communist party was particularly strong during the Soviet era. The indirect evidence presented here is suggestive of this view; confronting this view with direct evidence is an area of future research.
The importance of direct evidence regarding the "old habits" view is underscored by Remington (2010) , who offers a competing account of regional differences in economic outcomes observed within Russia. Under this account, regional differences in political institutions are fundamental for explaining differences in economic outcomes. Here, as a first-pass assessment of whether this view potentially impinges on our findings, we use the Petrov democracy index to characterize regional differences in political institutions, and re-conduct the two-stage least-squares analysis described above.
2 Specifically, we replace our regional measures of credit with the Petrov index as an explanatory variable for regional growth; as with the credit measures, we find a statistically and quantitatively significant relationship between the Petrov index and growth. In light of this finding, it is possible that the relationship observed between credit markets and growth is reflective of an omitted variables bias, under which regional political institutions are of primary importance in influencing regional economic development. Thus, it seems difficult to disentangle from the aggregate data the independent roles that financial development and political institutions have played in driving Russia's regional growth performance. This motivates an ongoing effort to discern the importance of these roles via direct evidence gathered at the micro level.
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In what follows, we first use an enriched data set to build on Berkowitz and DeJong (2010) , illustrating that the availability of bank-issued credit is closely associated with regional economic growth within Russia. In section 3 we seek to identify factors that account for regional variations in lending activity. To explore the extent to which credit-supply factors are operational in accounting for these variations, we employ a survey of firms conducted in the fall of 2006 in nineteen Russian regions.
Categorizing regions on the basis of the strength of the communist party during the Soviet era, the survey results indicate that credit-supply problems are relatively severe in regions where the communist 2 The Petrov index is a composite of ten specific measures of democracy; see Remington (2008) for a detailed description and evaluation, and section 5 of this paper for a description of the ten measures. The index was compiled under the direction of Nikolai Petrov and Alexei Titov of the Moscow Carnegie Center. The data are available at http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml.
party was relatively strong; in contrast, no such distinction is evident on the demand side. We supplement this evidence using a repeated survey of how firms view the regulatory environment in the nineteen Russian regions during [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , and find that access to credit is particularly problematic for small private firms. In section 4, we document the evidence noted above: that regional variations in the influence of the communist party evident in the former Soviet Union retain remarkable explanatory power in accounting for regional variations in bank-financing activity, conditional upon controlling for a battery of additional regional characteristics. In section 5, we illustrate the potential caveat regarding omitted variables associated with our two-stage least-squares estimates, and outline future work aimed at resolving this issue. We conclude in section 6.
Finance, Politics and Growth
In previous work (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2010) , we documented that bank-issued credit has been closely associated with regional patterns of growth observed within Russia. There, we measured bank-issued loans in per capita terms (i.e., credit was measured as the stock of ruble credits extended to In this section we complement this study by making three modifications. First, because additional data have become available, we now include two alternative measures of bank-issued credit:
purchasing power adjusted (across regions) credit per capita, and credit per unit income. Second, following the "old habits" narrative sketched in the introduction, we now use only regional variations in the strength of the Communist party in the last years of the Soviet Union as an instrument. 4 Finally, following standard practice in the empirical growth literature, we add to the list of conditioning variables a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in our growth regressions.
To measure growth we use household income rather than data on regional GDP. The reason for this is that GDP measures include the value of output generated by subsidized state enterprises, which is often disconnected from market valuations. Household income data more closely reflect market-driven activities. We adjust regional income levels to control for regional differences in ruble purchasing power in specific periods, and for differences in regional inflation over time. To make the adjustment for regional purchasing power, we normalize nominal income using an index that measures the cost of a basket of 83 consumer goods in the regions during the fourth quarter of 2007. Thus this normalization yields a nominal of purchasing power directly comparable across regions. This nominal measure is then converted to a real measure using monthly CPI data. This two-step conversion is used because the Table 1 contains an overview of the real income growth in Russia during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . During this period the growth in the average region in our sample was 15%, with all regions growing more quickly than 9%. Clearly, this dramatic growth is due is in due to some extent to the rapid growth in oil and gas prices after 2000. However, our analysis ignores the impact of these national level shocks and focuses on regional determinants of growth.
As noted, here we examine three alternative measures of bank credit issued to private individual borrowers (households and firms). The category of legal entities is excluded from these measures because it contains large state enterprises and members of financial industrial groups, both of which receive credits in part due to political connections. The first measure, credit per capita, is the stock of credit at the end of September 2001 normalized by regional population. The second measure, purchasing-power-adjusted credit per capita, is computed in two steps: first, the stock of credit at the end of March, September, June and December is normalized by the cost of a basket of consumer goods in March, June, September and December, respectively; then, these observations for March, June, September and December are averaged and normalized by regional population. 5 Finally, credit per unit of income is the stock of credit at the end of March, June, September and December, normalized by regional nominal income in March, June, September and December, respectively and then averaged.
Credit data for these measures is available on the website of the Central Bank of Russia (http://www.cbr.ru/eng/publ/main.asp?Prtid=BBSR). Table 2 credit and growth, we use regional voter-participation patterns from the 1989 elections in the former Soviet Union (PART) as an instrumental variable. These elections are considered to be the first "semicompetitive elections" in Soviet history. While Soviet citizens were allowed to vote for some representatives to the national legislature, these elections opened up positions of power to opposition 5 The basket of goods used to construct purchasing power adjustments contains 33 goods in 2001. 6 The construction of these variables is described in DeJong (2005, 2010) .
candidates and were a threat to the power of communist elites (McFaul and Petrov, 2004) . In practice however, most people did not want to vote because the choice of viable opposition candidates was somewhat limited. Thus turnout was relatively high in regions where the communist party remained strong, because their still -intact apparatus "that extended into state farms and enterprises" was able to mobilize its citizens to vote (Petrov, 2004 , p.250: also, see Berezkin et al., 1989 ).
McFaul and Petrov (2004) Figure 1 , a one-standarddeviation increase in voter participation is associated with a 0.4-standard-deviation decrease in the credit per capita residual (significant at the 1% level). In Figure 2 , a one-standard-deviation increase in voter participation is associated with nearly a 0.3-standard-deviation decrease in the credit per unit of income residual (also significant at the 1%level). Thus in both cases, communist power is negatively associated with emerging credit markets in 2001, after accounting for the set of controls we employ.
In order for voter participation to be a valid instrument, besides being relevant for credit in 2001, it must satisfy the exclusion restriction in the structural growth regression. While we have argued that the strength of the communist party in 1989 is plausibly relevant for explaining the regional variation of bank-issued credit in 2001, it is not obvious that voting should influence growth exclusively through emerging bank credit. In particular, regions wherein the communist party was strong in 1989 also tended to vote for anti-reformist parties in the 1990s (McFaul and Petrov., 2004) . In addition, Warner (2001) shows that ant-reformist voting for national legislative candidates in the Russian regions in 1995 is associated with slow price decontrol and slow privatization. In our work on market integration in Russia, we showed that regions that voted pro-communist in the 1996 elections often withdrew from internal markets, and this policy was associated with relatively poor economic performance (Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999) ; for an update of this evidence, see Gluschenko (2010) . Thus communist control in 1989 is plausibly associated with anti-reformist voting in the 1990s, which in turn is plausibly associated with the implementation of bad economic policies. To deal with this issue, then, we also control for voting patterns in the 1996 elections.
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The results we obtain closely resemble those obtained in our previous study (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2010) . Specifically, we estimate statistically significant (at the 10% level, at least) relationships between growth and all three measures of bank-issued credit. The relationships are quantitatively significant as well: in the full sample, a one-standard deviation increase in credit per capita, purchasingpower-adjusted credit per capita, and credit per unit of income is associated with an increase in real income per capita of 1.18, 1.3, and 1.25 annual percentage points, respectively. Removing outliers, the figures are 1.63, 1.28, and 2.11. Note also that the relationship between growth and credit is generally well-identified, as the F-test for the exclusion of 1989 voter participation rates in the first stage exceeds 10 in all but one case (credit per unit of income with outliers removed).
Variations in Bank-Lending Activity: A Supply-Side or Demand-Side Phenomenon?
While the evidence presented above indicates a close statistical relationship between regional variations in bank-lending activity and economic growth, and we have attempted to control for endogeneity in characterizing the relationship, it raises a fundamental question regarding whether it is reflective of supply-side or demand-side problems within regional credit markets. For example, it could be the case that for regions wherein bank-lending activity is relatively modest, the source of the culprit is apathy towards the pursuit of credit on the part of private firms. Such apathy could result, e.g., from regional economic conditions unrelated to credit access that have served to inhibit entrepreneurial activity. If this were the case it would not be appropriate to assign fundamental importance to the absence of credit as causal in accounting for regional variations in economic growth. Alternatively, if the source of the culprit is associated with issues regarding the availability of credit for firms seeking help with financing entrepreneurial endeavors, the assignment of causality would appear far more credible.
7 This was the run-off election between President Yeltsin, who wanted to continue with the advancement of economic reforms, versus Zyuganov, who pushed for a return to communist-style economic policy. Below we characterize Red Belt regions as those that voted for Zyuganov. This is considered to be one of the formative political moments of the 1990s, in which the old communists tried to reassert themselves. We obtain a similar characterization of the Red Belt using voting patterns reformist parties observed in the 1995 national legislative elections. Our data on regional voting in 1996 is taken from Clem and Craumer (2000) . Table 4 . Firms were categorized in three classes: all firms, private firms, and private firms owned by individual entrepreneurs. They were asked to respond to a battery of questions designed to characterize aspects of the climate they face in conducting their business, including issues regarding access to credit.
Motivated in part by the "old habits" hypothesis characterized above, and in part by a previous study of ours (Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999) , our analysis of these data focuses on the question of whether demand-and supply-side characteristics of regional credit markets differ systematically as a function of regional differences in the influence of the communist party observed during the time of the Soviet Union. Regarding the previous study, there we identified the existence of an internal border within Russia that we characterized as the Red Belt. Based on an analysis of the dispersion of commodity prices across regions measured in the early stages of Russia's economic transition, regions characterized as existing within the Red Belt (defined as regions in which reformist voting percentages in the 1996 presidential election were less than 50%) were observed to exhibit high degrees of price dispersion prevailing in their local markets, relative to prices in neighboring regions, which indicated economic isolation from their neighbors. Moreover, Red-Belt regions were observed as being slow to adopt economic reforms, and exhibited relatively low rates of economic growth. Thus we considered the Red Belt as a natural demarcation for potential regional differences in bank-lending activity.
As a measure of robustness, we selected additional demarcations on the basis of voter participation rates observed in the Soviet elections of 1989. Figure 3 presents the CDF of these participation rates, and suggests several natural cutoffs. Hereafter we will report results based on a single cutoff based on an 88% participation rate, though results based on neighboring cutoff rates are quite similar. A second question carries potential implications for both supply and demand: Has your firm tried to access credit in the past year? While primarily reflective of demand-side issues at first blush, this could reflect supply-side considerations as well for two reasons: difficulties in obtaining credit may necessitate greater efforts (more attempts) in obtaining credit, or may discourage efforts in obtaining credit. Regardless, conditional on responding affirmatively to the question regarding the need for credit, a higher proportion of firms above the 88% demarcation line reported attempts in obtaining credit than below the demarcation line: the average response was 1.25 above the line, and 1.38 below, with the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level on the basis of a standard t test. While this question muddles demand and supply issues, taken together with question 1, it does indicate that differences in access to credit observed across the demarcation line do not appear as the result of a lack of effort on the part of firms to obtain credit.
The final two questions fall squarely on the supply side: Has your firm managed to obtain credit in the past year?; Did your firm face problems when obtaining credit? The former question admitted three possible responses: 1 for yes, 2 for no, three for never. Again conditioning on firms who reported a need for credit, firms above the demarcation line reported greater failure rates in attempting to obtain credit (average scores are 1.98 versus 1.78); and greater problems in obtaining credit (1.7 versus 1.58).
Both differences are significant at the 5% level.
Having detected significant differences across the demarcation line with difficulties in obtaining credit, we turn to a broader range of questions asked in each round of the survey. One question addresses difficulties in accessing bank-issued loans; others ask about difficulties with tax rates and administration; anti-competitive barriers; political corruption; government regulations; business registration technicalities; and inspections. All questions admit five responses: 1 for no obstacle, 2 for minor obstacle, 3 for moderate obstacle, 4 for very severe obstacle, and 5 for life-threatening obstacle. Table 6 reports differences in means observed across the 88% demarcation line for all questions.
A negative difference indicates that difficulties were reported as relatively high among firms located in regions above the demarcation line. Among all firms, access to capital is not significantly more problematic for firms above the demarcation line. But for private firms, we obtain a difference of -0.28 (significant at the 10% level); and for private firms owned by entrepreneurs we obtain a difference of -0.78 (significant at the 1% level). Since we cannot condition on firms that actually have a need for access to credit in these surveys, this question is not as informative as that discussed in the context of Table 5 . For both sets of private firms, taxes (either their levels or issues regarding their administration) also seem relatively onerous in regions above the demarcation line, while systematic differences are generally not apparent in the additional categories included in the survey.
In sum, differences in patterns of bank-issued credit activity evident across regions do not appear to reflect credit-demand-side issues. Instead, challenges with credit availability appear as the underlying source of these differences. Next, we explore an empirical explanation of the source of these challenges: the "old habits" explanation.
Accounting for Regional Variations in Bank-Issued Credit
Having characterized regional variations in bank lending activity as largely reflecting supply-side issues, we now quantify the association of these variations with measures of the strength of the communist party during the Soviet era. The lesson we glean from this analysis is that communist-party influence measured during the Soviet era appears to have had a persistent influence on credit markets in the post-Soviet era. A plausible channel through which Soviet-era communists could exert lasting influence on current economic conditions is through their influence on regional politics. Evidence supporting this view is provided by McFaul and Petrov (2004) and Remington (2008 Remington ( , 2010 . Table 9 omitted-variables bias, they provide tentative evidence that the Soviet-era communist party has managed to remain influential in regional politics, which in turn has enabled it influence local credits as hypothesized under the "old habits" perspective.
An Alternative Characterization of Regional Economic Performance
As noted, the work of Remington (2010) suggests an alternative account of regional differences in economic outcomes observed within Russia. Under this account, regional differences in the quality of political institutions are fundamental for explaining differences in economic outcomes. As a first-pass assessment of whether this view potentially impinges on our findings, we use the Petrov democracy index to characterize regional differences in political institutions, and re-conduct the twostage least-squares analysis described above.
The Petrov measure includes ten components of regional democracy: regional political Table 10 reports two-stage least-squares estimates obtained using the Petrov index as an explanatory variable for regional growth. Details regarding the specification used here are exactly those described for the specification in Table 3 : we simply replaced the credit measures with the Petrov index, measured over 1991-2000, and 2000-2004. As with the credit measures, we find a statistically and quantitatively significant relationship between the Petrov index and growth. Specifically, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the index measured over 1991-2000 corresponds with a 1.56
percentage-point increase in regional growth, and a 1.59 percentage-point increase using the index measured over 2000-2004; both estimates are significant at the 5% level. In light of this finding, it is possible that the relationship observed between credit markets and growth is reflective of an omitted variables bias, under which regional political institutions are of primary importance in influencing regional economic development. Thus, it seems difficult to disentangle from the aggregate data the independent roles that financial development and political institutions have played in driving Russia's regional growth performance.
We will seek to resolve this problem by examining the relative empirical plausibility of two alternative narrative theories characterizing Russia's regional economic development. Under the first, regional political institutions are hypothesized as being of primary importance in promoting both financial development and economic growth; under the second, historical factors rather than regional political institutions are hypothesized as being of primary importance in determining regional patterns of financial development, which in turn is critically important in promoting economic growth (taking into account potentially complementary influences of political institutions).
As argued by Besley, Sturm and Persson (2010) , the first narrative characterizes state-level patterns of economic development similar to those observed in the post-Civil War US. Under this narrative, whereas in states featuring strong political institutions politicians who nurtured unfavorable economic climates (e.g., by imposing high taxes and stringent regulations on firms) could expect short political careers, in states featuring weak climates such politicians could become entrenched, to the lasting detriment of economic development. A similar narrative quite possibly characterizes patterns of development observed across Russian regions. Under this narrative, we would expect weak political institutions to be associated with restrictive regulatory environments.
Under the second narrative, regional patterns of development reflect persistence in the legacy of the former Soviet Union. Banks certainly existed in the former Soviet Union, but played roles quite distinct from their market-oriented counterparts: their primary role was to provide financing to state enterprises in support of efforts to fulfill centrally-planned production targets. As such targets took precedence over all competing considerations, state firms were typically unconstrained by finance (e.g., see Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003) . Soviet-era banks also collected taxes from the state-enterprise sector, and the credits they issued enabled regulators to monitor the activities of state enterprises (Garvy, 1977) . In the early stages of Russia's post-Soviet economic transition, commercial banks continued to perform many tasks inherited from the Soviet era, including providing credit to state firms, financing state-related programs, financing government debt, and even helping to redistribute state assets (Tompson, 1997) . Under this narrative, regional patterns in the development of bank-issued credit ought to reflect regional patterns of relative strength of the communist party during the Soviet era, wherein sympathy towards the Soviet model of banking was particularly strong. Of course, evidence of this relationship would be assessed conditionally on additional factors, including the relative strength of post-Soviet political institutions.
To move forward on this, our primary objective is to conduct a survey of commercial bankers and managers of entrepreneurial firms of in a select group of Russian regions in order to better understand determinants of the supply of bank credit. The survey will feature pointed questions designed to sharply distinguish between the narratives. To date we have designed the survey and made arrangements with VCIOM to achieve its execution; we are currently seeking funding to finance its execution.
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Conclusions
The rise of banks as important sources of financing for private firms is a relatively recent phenomenon within Russia, and its emergence and development has proceeded unevenly across regions. We have documented a strong statistical association between a regional measure of Soviet-era communist-party influence and regional differences in financial depth. Seeking an account for this relationship, the evidence we have presented here is consistent with an "old habits" view: in regions of historical strength, the communist party has been relatively successful in retarding the unshackling of banks from their Soviet-era responsibilities towards advancing the economic objectives of the state.
In future work we hope to further explore the plausibility of this view by supplementing the firm-level survey data we have explored here with additional surveys conducted on both sides of the bank-loan window. Specifically, while it would be helpful to extend the surveys of firms seeking bankissued credit across space and time, it would be equally helpful to survey banks as well.
From the firm side, we would like to dig deeper into the extent and nature of challenges they do or do not face in seeking to obtain bank-issued credit. For example, do firms need to signal political loyalty to local governments and banks to obtain loans? Are firms expected to use loans to complete projects that the local governments favor even if these projects are not necessarily profitable? Etc. From the bank side, what sorts of criteria do they establish for issuing loans? Are loans prioritized for relatively profitable firms, or firms loyal to political regimes? Are loans to private firms viewed as an important aspect of their overall mission? Etc. In short, there has been a great deal of survey and field work aimed at developing an understanding of the demand for bank-issued credit by small and entrepreneurial firms in developing economies and emerging markets (e.g., de Mel et al., 2008) . The case of Russia suggests that it would be helpful to enhance our understanding of supply-side factors as well.
9 VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) is the oldest and the leading opinion research company in postSoviet Russia. It was founded in 1987 by decree of the USSR Ministry of Labor as the first professional polling organization, and remains among the leaders in Russia's opinion research market. Currently the institution has the status of a joint stock company, and is functioning financially and legally autonomously from the state. Notes: Moscow is dropped from the sample because, unlike all the other regions, it has a developed credit market through the 1990s. Excluding Moscow, there are 67 regions for which we have a complete data set on financial depth, growth and initials conditions. Notes: Robust standard errors accompanying point estimates are given in parentheses: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. All independent variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a unit standard deviation. In all specifications the constant is estimated but not reported. The excluded instrument is voter participation in the 1989 election. The sample of credit measure is skewed upwards; outliers are defined as being two standard deviations greater than the sample average. Each cell contains the sample, then the standard error (in parentheses) and then the number of observations. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. We use the standard t-test of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in sample means, under the assumption that sample variances are the same in the two groups. Results are similar if we relax this assumption. Notes: All questions are on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = no obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle, 3 = moderate obstacle, 4 = very severe obstacle and 5 = life threatening. Each cell contains difference in mean, the standard error (in parentheses) and then the number of observations. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. We use the standard t-test to the test the null hypothesis that there is no difference in sample means, computed under the assumption that sample variances are the same in two groups. Results are similar if we relax this assumption. Each cell contains a point estimate for the differences in means between regions above and below the 88% threshold. A difference in means with a negative sign indicates that the situation is worse in areas above the threshold. Below the differences in sample means, there is a standard error (in parentheses) and the total number of observations. Notes: Variables for financial depth and voting are standardized. In each row there are 67 observations. Standard errors are robust; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Constants are estimated but not reported. Outliers are regions with credit measures two standard deviations above or below average. Remington (2008) , Section 7, for a discussion of these data on democracy and free media. In each row there are 67 observations. Standard errors are robust and *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Constants are estimated but not reported. 
